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THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC USE 
REQUIREMENT IN EMINENT DOMAIN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of eminent domain enables a sovereign to take private 
property for a public benefit 1 and, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, 
is operative without constitutional enumeration.2 A disturbing feature of 
eminent domain is that a government may take a person's property even 
though he objects to the taking.3 To curtail abuses, the United States 
Constitution4 as well as state constitutions provide certain restrictions. 5 
The fifth amendment, as extended to the states through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment,6 prohibits the taking of private 
property unless the taking is targeted for a public use and just compensa-
tion is provided. Despite these restrictions, the danger of abuse endures 
because of the liberal enforcement of the constitutional provisions by 
courts. 
This comment examines the current status of the "public use" re-
quirement as defined by recent Supreme Court decisions. First, the his-
torical background of the public use limitation is briefly explored, the 
evolution of the limitation is traced, and two competing philosophies are 
examined. Second, the comment analyzes the recent developments in 
eminent domain law in areas such as urban renewal, land reform, and 
sports. Emphasis is placed upon both the state and federal courts' in-
creasingly broader interpretation of the public use requirement and the 
corresponding deterioration of private property rights. Finally, the com-
ment discusses the ramifications of these recent developments, analyzes 
the current trend in this area of eminent domain law, and makes recom-
mendations designed to limit the potential abuses. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PUBLIC 
USE LIMITATION 
From the inception of the public use requirement, its exact meaning 
has been debated. At one time, two competing theories existed. The 
l. James v. Oravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937); BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 470 (Sth ed. 1979). 
2. See C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LoCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 18.1 (1980). 
3. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 
4SS (1981); In re Westlake Project, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d S49 (1981) (interpret-
ing the public use limitation in section 16 of article 1 of the Washington 
Constitution). 
4. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
S. In Maryland, restrictions upon the use of eminent domain can be found in sections 
40 through 40C of article III of the Maryland Constitution. MD. CONST. art. III, 
§§ 4O-4OC. 
6. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417'(1896). 
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first, coined the "broad view," regards public use as a public benefit.7 
Under this view, public use encompasses the creation of jobs, promotion 
of both land sales and industrial activity, and the development of natural 
resources within the state.S Under the broad view, condemned property 
may either be kept by a governing body or transferred to a private party. 
The second theory, labeled the "narrow view," advocates a "use-by-pub-
lic" test which requires the public to actually use the condemned prop-
erty.9 Under this rule, there is no public use unless some right for the 
public to use the property exists after condemnation. 10 
The broad interpretation of public use first emerged in the early 
nineteenth century. Its emergence coincided with the nation's early eco-
nomic growth and contributed to the development of the nation's com-
merce. II The broad interpretation enabled the government to quickly 
develop both railroad and highway networks throughout the country.I2 
By the mid-1800's, however, some courts, fearing that the government 
had been given excessive freedom to interfere with private property 
rights, opted for the narrow interpretation of the public use require-
ment. 13 By the tum of the century courts were divided over which the-
ory to apply.I4 
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Missouri Pacific 
Railway v. Nebraska. Is In that case the Court held that a state exercise 
of eminent domain for a private use was a violation of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thereafter, the Court reversed di-
rection. In Mount Vernon- Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Inter-
state Power Co., 16 it repudiated the "use by the public" test as applied to 
state takings. 17 Later, in Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles,Is the court 
demonstrated great deference to a state court's determination of what 
constitutes public use. Writing for the Court in Rindge Co., Justice San-
ford stated, "[T]his Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
should keep in view the diversity of such conditions and regard with 
great respect the judgments of state courts upon what should be deemed 
public uses in any State."19 
7. Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parameters of Limitless 
Power, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 397, 403. 
8.Id. 
9. Id. at 404. 
IO.Id. 
11. Note, The Public Use Requirement In Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 206 
(1978). 
12. Id. at 207-08. 
13. Id. at 209. 
14.Id. 
15. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
16. 240 U.S. 30 (1916). 
17. Id. at 32. 
18. 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (deferring to the state court's detennination that a county's 
condemnation of land for use as a public highway is a public use). 
19. Id. at 705-06; United States ex. rei. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Welch, 150 F.2d 613 
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III. CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE 
A. Urban Renewal 
The urban renewal cases illustrate the current approach to public 
use taken by both federal and state courts. In Berman v. Parker,20 the 
Supreme Court expanded the definition of public use and limited the 
scope of judicial review. The action arose after Congress passed the Dis-
trict of Columbia Redevelopment Act in 1945 to eliminate substandard 
housing and blighted areas in the District of Columbia.21 Through the 
Act, Congress created the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land 
Agency (DCRLA), an entity possessing the power to acquire property 
through condemnation, to transfer it to public agencies, and to sell the 
remainder to private individuals or groups.22 The Act authorized the 
agency to remove blighted sections of the community on an area-by-area 
basis.23 The new uses of the land were to be determined by the DCRLA 
in accordance with the needs of each particular community.24 
In Berman, the owners of a department store situated within a con-
demned area objected to their property being put under the management 
of a private agency and redeveloped for private uses.25 Showing great 
deference to Congressional authority, the Court rejected the owner's 
claim and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.26 The Court held that 
the Act was a legitimate exercise of Congress' police power over the Dis-
trict of Columbia and was therefore entitled to the same deference given 
to other police-power functions. 27 Further, the Court noted that the leg-
islature may utilize its police power to control public safety, public 
health, morality, peace and quiet, and law and order.28 Justice Douglas, 
delivering the majority opinion, stated: 
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as 
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. . .. If 
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Na-
tion's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is 
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.29 
(4th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 546 (1946) (court deferred to congressional finding 
that property taken for a darn project was for a public use). 
20. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
21. Id. at 28-29. 
22. Id. at 29-30. 
23. Id. at 34. 
24.Id. 
25. Id. at 31. 
26. Id. at 32. 
27.Id. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 33. Justice Douglas also stated: "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, 
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive. . . . The role of the jUdiciary in determining whether that power is 
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Id. at 32. 
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The liberalization of the public use clause has enabled governing 
bodies to literally pave the way for other transformations in urban devel-
opment, including the use of eminent domain to end economic malaise. 
In People ex reI. City of Urbana v. Paley,30 the City of Urbana employed 
the doctrine of eminent domain to foster economic revitalization.31 After 
examining the constitutionality of the plan, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
held that it satisfied the public use requirement.32 In so doing, the court 
averred: 
[T]oday's decision denotes that the application of the public-
purpose doctrine to sanction urban development can no longer 
be restricted to areas where crime, vacancy or physical decay 
produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public health. 
Stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic 
stagnation are also objectives which enhance the public 
wealth. 33 
In Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority, 34 the New 
York Court of Appeals examined the validity of concurrent New York 
and New Jersey legislation which authorized the New York Port author-
ity to condemn property for the construction of a world trade center. 
The proposed center was defined statutorily as a facility of commerce. 35 
Ruling that the proposed revenue project was constitutional, the court 
noted that increasing the flow of commerce through the Port of New 
York was a legitimate public purpose. 36 
The use of eminent domain to keep private industry from leaving a 
community has also been sanctioned. In Yonkers Community Develop-
ment Agency v. Morris,37 the City of Yonkers, intent on keeping one of 
the largest employers in its community, condemned a tract of land and 
sold it to a company at a substantial discount.38 In ruling that it was not 
unconstitutional for a city to use eminent domain to foster urban renewal 
by keeping an important business in the area,39 the Court of Appeals of 
30. 68 Ill. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977). 
31. Id. at 67,368 N.E.2d at 920. (economic revitalization plan involved the acquisition 
of real and personal property for the purpose of implementing a redevelopment plan 
for the business district). 
32. Id. at 78, 368 N.E.2d at 922. 
33. Id. at 74-75, 368 N.E.2d at 920-21. 
34. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 
(1963). 
35. "The proposed World Trade Center is defined by statute as ... a facility of com-
merce ... for the centralized accommodation of functions, activities and services for 
or incidental to the transportation of persons, the exchange, buying, selling, and 
transportation of commodities ... in world trade and commerce ... governmental 
services." Id. at 387, 190 N.E.2d at 404, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
36. Id. at 389, 190 N.E.2d at 405, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
37. 37 N.Y.2d 478,335 N.E.2d 327,373 N.Y.S.2d 112, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 
(1975). 
38. Id. at 483, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 118. 
39.Id. 
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New York explained that urban renewal has evolved from an effort to 
remove substandard and unsanitary conditions to an instrument utilized 
to stop economic stagnation and encourage economic development.4O 
In the 1980's, the definition of public use as a vehicle for urban re-
newal has continued to expand. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit,41 the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a challenge to the 
city of Detroit's exercise of eminent domain, significantly expanded the 
meaning of public use in the area of economic development. In 1980, 
General Motors Corporation notified the City of Detroit that it would 
close its Detroit Cadillac and Fisher plants in 1983.42 General Motors 
stated, however, that it would build an assembly complex in the city if it 
could obtain a site that met specified criteria.43 To avoid the loss of 6,000 
jobs, the city purchased the smal1 community of Poletown for $200 mil-
lion. The city then resold Poletown to GM for $8 million.44 
In exercising eminent domain, the city did not contend that 
Poletown was a blighted area. Instead, the city argued that due to the 
unemployment problem, it had a right to take private property and trans-
fer it to private industry.4s The court held that the legislative aim of 
alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the community's economic 
base was a valid interpretation of public use.46 Consequently, because of 
the significant public benefit created, the property could be condemned. 
B. Land Reform Outside of the Urban Setting 
Eminent domain has also been employed to aid land reform outside 
of the urban setting. In People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associ-
ates,47 large tracts of farmland belonging to a corporate owner on the 
island of Vieques were condemned in accordance with the land law of 
Puerto Rico and the Vieques Act. 48 The condemnation was aimed at 
improving the island's economy by subdividing large estates into smaller, 
privately operated units.49 
The corporate landowner in Eastern Sugar Associates argued that 
the condemnation was not based on public use because the government 
intended to transfer the land to private individuals. so The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit disagreed.s1 In deciding that this was a proper 
40. Id. at 481, 335 N.E.2d at 330, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 116-17. 
41. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). 
42. Id. at 636, 304 N.W.2d at 460. 
43.Id. 
44. Id. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469. 
45. Id. at 638, 304 N.W.2d at 461. 
46. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459. 
47. 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946). 
48. Id. at 318-19; see also 1941 P.R. Laws 1941, Act No. 26; 1944 P.R. Laws, Act. No. 
90. 
49. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d at 318-19. 
50. Id. at 323. 
51. Id. at 323-24. 
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public use, the court deferred to the local legislature, reasoning that the 
legislature was familiar with local conditions and was in the best position 
to determine what land uses would stimulate the local economy. 52 
Similarly, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,53 the United 
States Supreme Court considered whether the condemnation of private 
property by a state agency planning to transfer the property to a different 
private party was violative of the public use requirement. The dispute 
concerned the enactment of the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act au-
thorized the Hawaii Housing Authority, upon request by the lessees of 
the large landowners, to acquire property from the current owners by 
condemnation and sell it to the lessees. 54 
The plaintiffs were trustees of a major Hawaiian landholder. 55 The 
trustees contended that the state could not use its eminent domain power 
to transfer land from one private owner to another. 56 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the trustees, 
holding that the act was simply "a naked attempt on the part of the state 
of Hawaii to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for 
B's private use and benefit."57 
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower appellate court and held the act to be constitutional. 
The Court relied on its earlier interpretation of "police power" in 
Berman v. Parker58 and ruled that the exercise of eminent domain was 
within the realm of the state's police power. 59 Justice O'Connor noted 
that the legislature determines what governmental purposes are within 
the police power.6O Hence, at present, if the legislature concludes that a 
state governmental action involving eminent domain falls within the am-
bit of the police power, its decision is final, provided that, the exercise of 
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a legitimate public 
purpose.61 
Equating the eminetit domain power with the state's police power 
effectively limits the courts' role in protecting the constitutional re-
52. Id. at 324. 
53. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
54. Id. at 233. The land use plan examined in Midkiffresulted from the feudalistic land 
tenure system in Hawaii that allowed a handful of landowners to own the bulk of 
the land and lease it to individuals in small parcels. Id. at 232. The Hawaiian 
legislature found that forty-seven percent of the state's land belonged to seventy-two 
private landowners. Id. The legislature belieVed a land ownership change was nec-
essary to reduce both the concentration of land ownership and land prices. Id. at 
233. 
55. Id. at 229. 
56. Id. at 234-35. 
57. Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub. nom., Hawaii Housing. 
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
58. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (quoting from 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954». 
59. Id. at 241-42. 
60. Id. at 240-41. 
61. Id. at 243. 
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straints regarding private property rights. Courts must accept the public 
purpose determination made by the legislature unless it is totally unrea-
sonable. By applying the police power analysis, the public use require-
ment is subjected to such low-level scrutiny that almost any use may be 
deemed permissible. 
C. Sports 
A broad interpretation of the public use requirement in eminent do-
main law has also been applied where cities have used sports franchises 
to aid their economy. It has played an integral role during stadium con-
struction and has been used as a vehicle in attempting to keep teams in 
their current locations. In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders Ltd. ,62 the 
Supreme Court of California considered whether a municipality could 
utilize eminent domain to keep a professional sports franchise from leav-
ing the city. In 1980, the owner of the Oakland Raiders football team 
announced his intention to move the team to Los Angeles.63 To prevent 
the move, the City of Oakland initiated an eminent domain action to 
acquire the property rights of the professional team.64 Following deci-
sions in favor of the Oakland Raiders in both the trial court and lower 
appellate court, the Supreme Court of California granted certiorari.6s 
The court considered two questions: (1) whether intangible prop-
erty could be taken by eminent domain and (2) whether the public use 
requirement was broad enough to encompass the taking of a sports 
franchise. 66 In response to the first issue, the court held that intangible 
property could be taken by eminent domain.67 This conclusion is signifi-
cant because it broadened the eminent domain power beyond the taking 
of real property. As a result, franchises, patent rights, charters or any 
other form of contract throughout the country may be vulnerable to their 
sovereign's exercise of its eminent domain power.68 
In respect to the second issue, the court held that "the acquisition 
and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an appropriate 
municipal function. If such valid public use can be demonstrated, the 
statutes discussed . . . afford the City the power to acquire by eminent 
62. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). 
63. Id. at 63, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675. 
64.Id. 
65. The lower appellate court upheld the trial court on the basis that the enterprise was 
intangible property not subject to acquisition by the city in an eminent domain pro-
ceeding. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 424, 176 
Cal. Rptr. 646, 650 (1981), vacated, 32 Cal. 3d 60,646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 
(1982). 
66. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 64 P.2d 835, 837, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982). 
67. Id. at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678. "For eminent domain purposes, 
neither the federal nor the state constitution distinguishes between property which is 
real or personal, tangible or intangible ... we conclude that our eminent domain 
law authorizes the taking of intangible property." Id. 
68. See id. at 65, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677. 
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domain any property necessary to accomplish that use. "69 
The influence of eminent domain on sports franchises has also sur-
faced in Mayor of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football CO.70 In 1984, Balti-
more attempted to use its eminent domain power to enjoin the owner of 
the Baltimore Colts football team from moving the franchise to Indian-
apolis, Indiana. Fearing that a timely eminent domain action might suc-
ceed, Colts owner Robert Irsay moved the team's physical possessions 
out of Baltimore on March 29, 1984.71 On March 30, 1984, Maryland's 
governing body enacted legislation that would enable Baltimore to con-
demn sports franchises. 72 On the same day, the Mayor and City Council 
of Baltimore enacted an ordinance authorizing condemnation.73 Under 
the authority of the newly enacted legislation, the city filed a petition in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Subsequently, the city removed the 
condemnation action to the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland. 
After reviewing Maryland procedural law, the district court held 
that filing an eminent domain action did not give the city the right to 
attain possession of the franchise until compensation was paid.74 Addi-
tionally, responding to the Colt's argument that condemnation may not 
proceed against property not located within Maryland, the court found 
three factors to be determinative of the location of the franchise: (1) the 
team's principal place of business; (2) the location of its essential tangible 
property; and (3) the owner's intentions. 75 After applying these factors 
to the case, the court ruled that the situs of the franchise was not in 
Baltimore, where the suit was brought, but in Indianapolis.76 Therefore, 
69. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681. 
70. 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985). 
71. Id. at 280. 
72. See Act of March 29, 1984, ch. 6, 1984 Md. Laws 18, 20. The act amended the 
powers of the City of Baltimore to include the power: 
(2)(B) To acquire by purchase or condemnation any professional sports 
franchise which has or had the territorial rights to represent Baltimore 
City on or after January 1, 1983, including without limitation, (1) the 
franchise right to compete in an organized league or association; (2) the 
business entity owning or operating such franchise; (3) all contractual 
rights owned by the business entity which are necessary, incident, and ap-
propriate to ownership and operation of such franchise; (4) all interests in 
and rights to real property owned by the business entity which are neces-
sary, incident, and appropriate to ownership and operation of such 
franchise; and (5) any and all other property rights; wherever the same 
may be located in the state of Maryland, whether tangible, intangible, real, 
personal, or mixed owned by the business entity, or to which the business 
entity has a claim, which are necessary, incident to and appropriate to the 
operation of a professional sports franchise in Baltimore City; and to sell 
or otherwise dispose of such franchise and collateral rights, in whole or in 
part, subject to such restrictions and reservations as may be necessary or 
appropriate. 
73. See Baltimore City, Md., Emergency Ordinance No. 32 (1984). 
74. Baltimore Football Co., 624 F. Supp. at 283. 
75. Id. at 287. 
76. Id. The court noted that (1) the team's principal place of business was in Indianap-
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the city did not have the right to exercise eminent domain. 77 
Although the cities in both the City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders 
Ltd. and the Mayor of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Co. cases were 
unable to stop thei~' teams from leaving through the use of eminent do-
main, the cases are nevertheless significant. These cases support the prop-
osition that as long as certain requirements are satisfied,78 ownership of a 
sports franchise can constitute a public purpose. 
The question of what constitutes a public purpose has arisen in 
other contexts relating to professional sports franchises as well. In Myer 
v. City of Cleveland,79 the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that Cleveland 
could use its eminent domain power to aid stadium construction because 
the taking of property was for a public purpose.80 In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court noted that "generally speaking, anything calculated 
to promote the education, the recreation, or the pleasure of the public is 
to be included within the legitimate domain of public purposes."81 
Under the broad judicial interpretation of public use in eminent do-
main law, cities have also constructed stadiums for the purpose of entic-
ing sports franchises to locate in their community. In New Jersey Sports 
& Exposition Authority v. McCrane,82 the enabling legislation examined 
by the court was enacted "in order to induce professional athletic teams 
... to locate these franchises in the State."83 The legislature also believed 
that the new facilities were needed to promote industrial and economic 
development, as well as to provide a forum for public events. 84 
In deciding whether the legislative act authorizing condemnation vi-
olated the New Jersey Constitution, the court stated that great deference 
should be given to the legislature's determination of what is a public pur-
pose.8S The court acknowledged that a sports complex would provide 
many new cultural, recreational and economic benefits to the people of 
olis, (2) the team's tangible property was not in Maryland on March 30, 1984, and 
(3) Irsay's intention was that the Colts be outside the jurisdiction of Maryland by 
the time any eminent domain,action was filed. Id. 
77. Id. The court pointed out that an eminent domain analysis was not required be-
cause the Colts prevailed on the threshold issue of the appropriate date for deter-
mining the situs of the franchise. Id. 
78. In California, there are restrictions on the type of entity that could exercise the 
power of eminent domain. A municipality, such as Oakland, lacked this inherent 
power and therefore an express grant by law was necessary for the taking to be 
proper. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 
838, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982). 
79. 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606 (1930). 
80. Id. at 22, 171 N.E. at 608. 
81. Id. at 21, 171 N.E. at 607 (quoting Egan v. County of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 
133 P. 294 (1913». 
82. 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1,292 
A.2d 545 (1972). 
83. Id. at 463, 292 A.2d at 583. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. at 470, 292 A.2d at 590. 
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the state. 86 Additionally, it noted that a city, instead of concerning itself 
with mere survival, should attempt to develop a personality that attracts 
both tourists and businessmen.87 Consequently, the court held that the 
construction and maintenance of a stadium was a public purpose. 88 
IV. A CRITICAL LOOK AT PUBLIC USE 
Decisions in eminent domain cases demonstrate a willingness by 
both federal and state courts to expand the definition of public use and to 
observe greater deference to takings by Congress and state and local gov-
ernments. The definition of public use in the exercise of eminent domain 
for urban renewal has been expanded to encompass removing blight,89 
keeping existing industry,90 ending economic stagnation,91 reducing un-
employment,92 and attracting professional sports franchises. 93 Although 
expansion in these areas has continued, some judges have expressed con-
cern over the expansion of the definition of "public use." Referring to 
the public use and just compensation limitations on the power of eminent 
domain in its state constitution, the Supreme Court of Washington 
stated: 
These two restrictions were placed in the constitution for the 
protection of private property, and each one is equally as im-
portant to the property owner as the other. In other words, it is 
just as important that the proposed use of the property be lim-
ited to what the court decides to be a "really public" use as it is 
that property owner be given just compensation.94 
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,95 dissenting Justice 
Ryan, reiterating the fears expressed by earlier justices, argued that the 
majority decision "seriously jeopardized the security of all private prop-
erty ownership."96 A similar warning was voiced by Judge Van Voorhis' 
dissent in Courte~y Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority.97 
To encourage economic growth, the courts have significantly ex-
86. Id. at 477, 292 A.2d at 593. 
87. Id. at 487, 292 A.2d at 597. 
88. Id. at 493, 292 A.2d at 598. 
89. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
94. Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799,838, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (1959). 
95. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). 
96. Id. at 645, 304 N.W.2d at 465. 
97. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 398, 190 N.E.2d 402, 407, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9 (Van Voorhis, J., 
dissenting), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963) (per curiam). Judge Van Voorhis 
stated: "[T]here is a limit beyond which socialization cannot be carried without the 
destruction of the constitutional bases of private ownership and enterprise. . . . 
[C]ourts should enforce the constitutional rights of property which are involved 
here." Id. at 399, 190 N.E.2d at 411, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (Van Voorhis, J., 
dissenting). 
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panded the definition of public use in the professional sports franchise 
context. Other than a possible commerce clause limitation and each 
state's own constitutional restrictions,98 almost no limit to a govern-
ment's ability to exercise eminent domain in the context of sports 
franchises is evident. In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders Ltd., 99 
Chief Justice Bird attacked the majority for not giving more considera-
tion to the encroachment on private property rights caused by adopting 
an expanded view of public use. lOO Arguing for a more restrictive ap-
proach, Justice Bird stated, "At what point in the varied and complex 
business involved herein would this power to condemn end? In my view, 
this court should proceed more cautiously before placing a constitutional 
imprimatur upon this aspect of creeping statism."IOI. 
These judges question whether the expansion of our government's 
eminent domain power can coexist with an individual's right to own 
property. These dissenters acknowledge that a potential problem exists, 
but do not clarify or place limits on the definition of public use. Both the 
majority and dissenting positions tactfully skirt the dilemma. The major-
ity avoids the issue by giving great deference to legislative determina-
tions; the dissent declares that this will have an adverse effect in the 
future, yet offers no plausible solution to the problem. Meanwhile, pri-
vate property rights are being eroded. 
The United States and state constitutions are predicated upon the 
protection and preservation of individual rights, including the right to 
own property. Protecting private property from unwarranted interfer-
ence is firmly rooted in our concept of how an ideal society should oper-
ate.102 Recognizing this point in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 103 
Justice Stewart stated: 
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to 
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the 
right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' 
right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a 
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental inter-de-
pendence exists between the personal right to liberty and the 
personal right in property. Neither could have meaning with-
out the other.l04 
The current trend in interpreting the constitutional "public use" require-
ment subsumes private property rights in favor of uses that are arguably 
98. See J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 9 
(1982). 
99. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). 
100. [d. at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
101. [d. 
102. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). 
103. [d. at 552. 
104. [d. 
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not in the public interest. By examining the broad interpretation of pub-
lic use and the expansive deference given to legislatures in exercising 
their eminent domain powers, it becomes apparent just how problematic 
this trend has become. 
The decisions reviewed indicate that both the legislatures and the 
courts consider that the needs of the general public outweigh an individ-
ual's private property rights. This concept is currently accepted even 
when an individual's property is taken by the state and transferred to 
another individual. This is the same exercise of eminent domain that, in 
the past, was prohibited. 105 
The erosion of private property rights has occurred, in part, because 
of the absence of a specific definition of the term "public use." When 
complying with the public use clause, a government must show only that 
there is a rational basis for taking land. 106 Consequently, unless a statute 
authorizing condemnation is totally unreasonable, courts will defer to the 
legislative determinations. 107 As a result, property owners are provided 
with virtually no constitutional protection. 
In discussing the future impact of the courts' limited review of con-
demnation, constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe states that the de-
cision in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff effectively grants states and 
municipalities the power to "rearrange property interests through emi-
nent domain."lo8 Tribe also notes that the "principle has important im-
plications for rulings in such diverse areas as rent control, condominium 
conversion and efforts by states to deal with land shortage: absentee 
ownership and oligopolistic concentration of land holdings."I09 
Additional criticisms concerning unrestrained eminent domain use 
have been voiced. It has been argued that a governmentally compelled 
transfer of private property from one individual to another is often the 
result of improper motives, such as the desire to aid a favored citizen.110 
It has also been argued that a transfer of property from one private indi-
vidual to another may result in a lack of public accountabilitylll because 
the property may be taken out of the public's view. Further, condemna-
105. See. e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); 
Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885), a./J'g 29 F. 871 (1885); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798). 
106. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
107. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). The Court noted 
that "[t]he constitutional requirement is satisfied if the state legislature rationally 
could have believed that the Act would promote its objective." Id. at 242 (quoting 
from Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 
671-72 (1981». 
108. Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Wolf in Sheeps' Clothing? 12 W. ST. 
U.L. REV. 325, 342 (1985) (citing Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1984, at 1, col. 6). 
109. Id. at 342. 
110. Note, Constitutional Law - The Demise Of The Public Use Doctrine In State Tak-
ings: Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 18 CREIGTON L. REv. 789, 813 (1985). 
111. Id. 
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tion could have adverse effects on future economic development. I 12 For 
example, private investors may avoid investing in property which is 
deemed susceptible to a taking by a state or local government. 
Possibly, the compelling circumstances in cases like Poletown and 
Midkiff warrant an intrusion upon private ownership. In both Midkiff 
and Poletown, private property was taken from one individual and given 
to another. Perhaps, in both instances, the lack of available land necessi-
tated the condemnation. In Midkiff, land was limited because of a land 
oligopoly traceable to the early high chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands. 113 In 
Poletown, the government was faced with the loss of a major employer in 
Detroit. I 14 
At times, the definition of public use has expanded in circumstances 
when certain local conditions and problems need addressing. Land is a 
limited resource and condemnation for the good of the community can 
provide some solutions to societal problems. In permitting the unbridled 
expansion of eminent domain in these instances, however, courts fail to 
recognize that the trend evidenced by the decisions is still a real danger. 
As the Supreme Court of Kentucky noted: 
Naked and unconditional government power to compel a citi-
zen to surrender his productive and attractive property to an-
other citizen who will use it predominantly for his own private 
profit just because such alternative private use is thought to be 
preferable in the subjective notion of governmental authorities 
is repugnant to our constitutional protections whether they be 
cast in the fundamental fairness component of due process or in 
the prohibition against the exercise of arbitrary power. llS 
By limiting the public use requirement examination to a reasonable-
ness test, ll6 courts have kept the requirement in name only. By deferring 
to the state's expansive use of eminent domain, courts have left the term 
devoid of meaning. 
V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
The public use requirement of the fifth amendment as presently 
viewed no longer appears to limit the use of eminent domain. Without 
112. Id. 
113. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also supra notes 53-
61 and accompanying text. 
114. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 
455 (1981); see also supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
115. City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W. 263, 4-6 (Ky. 1979) (court struck down 
the Kentucky Local Industrial Development Act which granted the unconditional 
right to condemn property and convey it to private developers for industrial 
development). 
116. The "reasonableness" standard as used by the courts in examining governmental 
actions is extremely deferential. See Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 222 U.S. 
61 (1911). 
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an effective public use limitation, Congress and state legislators may 
abuse the discretionary power vested in them by the courts. Hence, sev-
eral solutions offered by legal commentators merit scrutiny. One sugges-
tion calls for the legislature to list all the approved uses of eminent 
domain.1l7 This solution, however, is most likely not feasible. Today's 
societal problems are complex and ever changing. 1I8 Therefore, legisla-. 
tures must be able to act without the restraints of precise, inflexible 
guidelines. 119 
Another suggestion aimed at curbing governmental taking powers 
involves shifting the burden of proof in an eminent domain dispute. 12o 
Currently, the burden rests on the party whose land is being taken to 
show that a proposed use is not public and is thus invalid. 121 Due to the 
weakened role of the public use restriction, an impossible burden is im-
posed upon the property owner. By shifting the burden of proof to the 
government, the sovereign would have to affirmatively demonstrate that 
the proposed use was a public one. Unfortunately, this proposal does not 
offer significant protection to the property rights of the individual be-
cause the test, which is the reasonableness of the taking, remains one the 
government would have little problem meeting. 122 
The only remaining viable solution is for courts to apply a stricter 
test in certain types of eminent domain actions. In this way a balance 
could be struck between the presumption of the right to own property 
and a governing body's right to exercise eminent domain. In those situa-
tions where a sovereign transfers private property from one individual to 
another, courts should apply a stricter scrutiny. In all other situations, 
the reasonableness standard could remain. 
Courts have articulated restrictions that must be complied with 
before the government may transfer property from one individual to an-
other through eminent domain. For example, in Berrien Springs Water 
Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge,123 the Supreme Court of Michigan 
stated that such a transfer of property was invalid unless the property is 
devoted to public use independent of the will of the private entity acquir-
ing it. 124 Additionally, other courts have stated that such a transfer is not 
permissible unless the taking is to aid an instrumentality of commerce, 125 
or a private improvement where the public welfare requires that the im-
provement be undertaken. 126 
117. See Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders 
and Poletown, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 82, 105 (1983). 
118. See Note, supra note 117, at 105. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 105-06. 
121. See id. at 106. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
123. 133 Mich. 48, 94 N.W. 379 (1903). 
124. [d. at 53, 94 N.W. 380-81. 
125. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
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Some courts have also held that before a condemnation resulting in 
property transfers between private parties can occur, the following three 
requirements must be met: (1) public necessity of the extreme sort; (2) 
continued accountability to the public; and (3) land selection according 
to facts of independent significance. 127 Condemnation for the purpose of 
urban renewal could satisfy this first requirement. In those cases involv-
ing urban blight, condemnation of private property was necessary be-
cause the property was detrimental to the community as a whole. The 
second requirement would pacify all of those who did not object to con-
demnations in cases like Poletown 128 and Midkiff, 129 but were concerned 
about the possible subsequent ramifications of such rulings. While a city 
may still take another person's property to satisfy a legitimate public pur-
pose, it can do so only if it continues to show the public how this purpose 
has been satisfied. Finally, the third requirement calls for the govern-
ment to prove that the property condemned was chosen for public bene-
fit, not for the advantage of the property beneficiary. 
As Justice Stewart has stated, the right to enjoy property is a "per-
sonal" right,130 and restrictions were placed in the constitution for its 
safeguarding. l3l To ensure the protection of the right, courts should 
adopt a two-tiered analysis similar to the one used in equal protection 
cases. First, if the property taken is retained by the condemning author-
ity, it is only necessary to show that the taking is reasonable. Second, in 
cases where property is transferred to a private party, courts should ex-
amine the action more closely. In these cases, the condemnor must show 
that the taking serves a more urgent and necessary governmental 
interest. 
Courts and legislatures should not, however, return to the narrower 
interpretation of public use adopted in the early 20th century as a means 
to solve this dilemma.132 That approach would altogether prohibit the 
transfer of condemned property to private individuals. As a result, our 
economy would suffer. As seen in Poletown 133 and Midkiff, 134 certain 
local conditions may demand a condemnation action. In contrast, 
merely requiring governing bodies to meet a reasonableness standard 
when property is transferred from one private individual to another nulli-
fies the effect of the fifth amendment's public use clause. The clause was 
meant to provide citizens and their property with protection against gov-
ernmental action. 135 It is a judicial responsibility to ensure that this pro-
127. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 622, 304 
N.W.2d 455, 478-80 (1981). 
128. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
130. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). 
131. [d. at 544. 
132. See supra notes 9-10, 13, 15 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
135. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1945). 
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tection continues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this century, most courts have so expanded the defini-
tion of public use that the constitutional clause no longer acts as a re-
straint on the taking of private property. At the expense of the private 
property holder, courts now give great deference to governing bodies by 
requiring only that the purpose behind a condemnation action be reason-
able. To more adequately protect private property rights, courts should 
enact a test that applies a stricter scrutiny to situations where property is 
taken from a private party and given to another. A more stringent test 
would ensure that condemnations are actually for the public good and 
that the constitutional public use requirement is not ignored. 
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